Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant: What Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant project reveals for newcomer countries

Akkuyu highlights a hard truth: Nuclear ambition is not the same as nuclear delivery

The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant is Türkiye’s first step into nuclear energy and one of the most significant nuclear projects currently under construction in a newcomer country. The project offers valuable lessons for countries considering nuclear power, particularly in financing, governance, delivery models and the management of long-term programme risks.

Türkiye has pursued nuclear power since the 1970s, but for decades that ambition did not translate into delivery. Earlier initiatives repeatedly stalled, including unsuccessful tender rounds and cancelled procurement efforts. The pattern reflected three persistent constraints: economic instability, political discontinuity and the absence of a long-term international partner willing and able to finance and support a first nuclear project.^[1]International Atomic Energy Agency, Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Türkiye, https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Turkey/Turkey.htm; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, … Continue reading

That history matters because nuclear power requires more than political ambition. A first nuclear project depends on a durable legal framework, sustained political commitment, credible regulation, access to finance and a delivery model that can be maintained over many years. Where those conditions are weak, programmes often remain at the planning stage.

Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, therefore, matters beyond Türkiye itself. It offers a practical case study of how a newcomer country can move from repeated failure to construction, while also showing how the chosen delivery model can create new long-term risks.

The policy shift that enabled progress

The decisive change came in the 2000s, when Türkiye adopted a more structured approach to nuclear development. A key step was Law No. 5710 of 2007, which established a legal basis for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and for the sale of the electricity they generate.^[2]Republic of Türkiye, Law No. 5710 on the Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and the Sale of Energy Generated Therefrom. Official legal database: https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/; Official … Continue reading Over time, the institutional framework for licensing and oversight also developed further, culminating in the establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority as the country’s independent nuclear regulator.^[3]Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Türkiye (NDK), https://www.ndk.gov.tr/; International Atomic Energy Agency, Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Türkiye, … Continue reading

Equally important, Türkiye adopted a government-to-government approach to project development. That led to the 2010 intergovernmental agreement with the Russian Federation and the selection of Rosatom for the Akkuyu project.^[4]Akkuyu Nuclear JSC, official project website, https://akkuyu.com/en; project history page, https://akkuyu.com/en/about/history; International Atomic Energy Agency, Country Nuclear Power Profiles: … Continue reading In practical terms, this addressed one of the central weaknesses of earlier Turkish efforts: the absence of a delivery partner prepared to take on financing, technology and execution risk over the long term.

Akkuyu is planned as a four-unit nuclear power plant using VVER-1200 reactors, with a total installed capacity of approximately 4,800 MW. Once fully operational, it is expected to supply around 10 per cent of Türkiye’s electricity demand.^[5]Akkuyu Nuclear JSC, official project website, https://akkuyu.com/en; plant information and technical overview pages available through the site’s English-language navigation. Construction began in 2013. Based on current public reporting, the first unit is expected to enter commercial operation in 2026, with the remaining units targeted by 2028.^[6]Akkuyu Nuclear JSC news section, https://akkuyu.com/en/media/news; World Nuclear News, “First unit at Akkuyu NPP to be operational in 2026”, … Continue reading

How the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) nuclear model works

Akkuyu is distinctive because it is being delivered under a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model under which Rosatom finances, builds, owns, and operates the plant, while Türkiye commits to purchasing electricity under long-term arrangements.^[7]Akkuyu Nuclear JSC, official project website, https://akkuyu.com/en; World Nuclear Association, country information pages available via https://world-nuclear.org/.

The distinction between BOO and more conventional nuclear delivery models is important.

Under a conventional model, the host country, a state-owned utility or a domestic project company owns the plant. It raises the financing, while reactor vendors and contractors are engaged under separate contracts to design, build and, in some cases, support commissioning. Operational responsibility usually sits with, or transfers to, the host-country owner or its operating subsidiary. That is broadly the model used at Barakah in the United Arab Emirates, where the plant is owned by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and operated by Nawah Energy Company, with a KEPCO-led consortium delivering the project under an EPC structure.^[8]Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), official website, https://www.enec.gov.ae/. It is also broadly the model at Olkiluoto 3 in Finland, which is owned by TVO, with Areva-Siemens contracted to deliver the plant.^[9]Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO), official website and Olkiluoto 3 project information, https://www.tvo.fi/en/; World Nuclear Association, Finland country profile and Olkiluoto overview: … Continue reading By contrast, under Akkuyu’s BOO model, Rosatom is not only the technology vendor or the main contractor; it also finances, owns and operates the plant over the long term. The difference is therefore not merely contractual. It goes to the allocation of capital burden, operational control and long-term strategic dependence.

For countries entering nuclear power for the first time, the attraction is obvious. Nuclear power is capital-intensive, and financing is often the main barrier to entry. Public reporting has put Akkuyu’s cost in the range of roughly USD 20-30 billion.^[10]Rosatom, corporate website, https://www.rosatom.ru/en/; Reuters coverage of Akkuyu financing and cost at https://www.reuters.com/. A BOO structure can therefore unlock a project that might otherwise remain unaffordable through domestic public finance alone.

The model also shortens the learning curve. A state with limited nuclear experience gains access to an established reactor technology, project delivery capability, operating expertise and fuel-cycle support. In that sense, BOO can function as an entry mechanism for countries that want nuclear power but do not yet have the institutional maturity, industrial base or financing capacity to deliver a conventional utility-owned project.’

The risks created by concentrated dependency

The same features that make BOO attractive also create its principal risk: concentrated dependency.

Under Akkuyu’s structure, Türkiye depends heavily on a single foreign partner for reactor technology, key plant delivery, fuel supply, operations, and much of the long-term service model.^[11]Akkuyu Nuclear JSC, official project website, https://akkuyu.com/en; World Nuclear Association, country information pages available via https://world-nuclear.org/.

Some external dependence is unavoidable in most first nuclear projects. However, BOO concentrates that dependence more sharply than many alternative ownership structures.

This matters in several ways.

First, it affects control. Where ownership, operation, and key technical knowledge remain external, the host country has less influence over long-term costs, maintenance strategies, operational capabilities, and future decision-making.

Second, it affects domestic capacity-building. A newcomer country can still gain experience through regulation, construction oversight and local contracting, but a foreign-owned and foreign-operated model offers less direct scope for building a nationally controlled operating fleet.

Third, it affects resilience. Nuclear plants operate for many decades. Over that period, commercial conditions, geopolitical relationships and sanctions environments can change materially. In Akkuyu’s case, the broader restrictions on Russian-linked business activity after 2022 created complications in areas such as payment channels, procurement, and logistics, even where Rosatom itself was not uniformly sanctioned in all jurisdictions.^[12]Reuters coverage of sanctions, financing and procurement disruption affecting Russian-linked activity, https://www.reuters.com/; World Nuclear News reporting on supply-chain and sanctions issues, … Continue reading In a conventional delivery model, some of these pressures might be distributed across a wider set of counterparties. Under BOO, they are harder to diversify.

This does not mean BOO is inherently flawed. It means the model reallocates rather than removes risk. It reduces the host country’s initial financing burden, but increases long-term exposure to counterparty concentration and geopolitical change.

How Akkuyu has been delayed

Akkuyu has experienced material programme slippage against its earlier target of bringing the first unit into operation in 2023. More recent project updates and industry reporting point to a later first-unit start-up window in 2026.^[13]Akkuyu Nuclear JSC news section, https://akkuyu.com/en/media/news; World Nuclear News, “First unit at Akkuyu NPP to be operational in 2026”, … Continue reading That is notable, but it is not unusual for a first nuclear project.

Several factors help explain the delay.

One is institutional development. A first nuclear programme not only involves building a power plant; it also requires building the legal, regulatory and governance environment needed to license and oversee it. Even when that work begins early, it remains time-consuming and can affect the programme’s pace.^[14]Republic of Türkiye, Law No. 5710 on the Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and the Sale of Energy Generated Therefrom. Official legal database: https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/; Official … Continue reading, ^[15]Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Türkiye (NDK), https://www.ndk.gov.tr/; International Atomic Energy Agency, Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Türkiye, … Continue reading

A second factor is technical complexity. Nuclear construction requires rigorous quality assurance, extensive documentation, strict sequencing and rigorous safety compliance. These requirements can extend schedules even in experienced markets.

A third factor is external disruption. Since 2020, global supply chains have been affected by the pandemic, inflation, logistics disruption and geopolitical tension. In Akkuyu’s case, Russia-related financial and commercial restrictions added further difficulty to cross-border transactions and procurement.^[16]Reuters coverage of sanctions, financing and procurement disruption affecting Russian-linked activity, https://www.reuters.com/; World Nuclear News reporting on supply-chain and sanctions issues, … Continue reading

A fourth factor is interface management. Akkuyu has involved Turkish contractors alongside the main nuclear vendor, which supports local participation but also increases coordination risk. Public reporting in 2022 highlighted contractor disputes on the project, illustrating how commercial interfaces can affect progress on large, technically complex projects.^[17]Reuters reporting on the 2022 contractor dispute at Akkuyu, https://www.reuters.com/; World Nuclear News coverage of Akkuyu project developments, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/.

The broader lesson is that nuclear delay is rarely caused by one issue alone. It usually results from technical, institutional, commercial, and geopolitical pressures that accumulate over time.

Seven lessons newcomer countries should take from Akkuyu

For governments, investors and developers in newcomer markets, Akkuyu offers several practical lessons.

1. Political support must be durable

A first nuclear project cannot be delivered on short political cycles. It requires continuity in policy, funding support and institutional direction over many years.

2. Institutional readiness is part of the project

Legal and regulatory development should not be treated as parallel administrative work. It is part of delivery. Weak governance will eventually affect the project schedule, access to finance, and credibility.

3. The financing model is often the decisive variable

For many newcomer countries, the main barrier is not technology. It is capital. Akkuyu shows how an alternative delivery model can unlock progress where conventional procurement structures may struggle.

4. Dependency must be managed, not assumed away

External support will be necessary in most first nuclear projects. The strategic question is how to limit unnecessary concentration of risk through contract design, capability-building and diversification where possible.

5. Geopolitical exposure should be treated as a core project risk

Where ownership, fuel supply, financing, or operation depend heavily on a single foreign state or vendor, geopolitical change can affect both project delivery and long-term energy security.

6. Schedules should be built on realism, not optimism

Nuclear programmes take time. Newcomer countries should plan for delay risk from the outset rather than treating it as an unforeseen exception.

7. Local participation needs strong interface management

Domestic involvement is valuable, but only if roles, responsibilities, quality requirements and dispute-resolution mechanisms are clearly defined.^[18]Reuters reporting on the 2022 contractor dispute at Akkuyu, https://www.reuters.com/; World Nuclear News coverage of Akkuyu project developments, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/.

What Akkuyu means for future nuclear programmes

Akkuyu is a major milestone in Türkiye’s energy history. It shows that a newcomer country can move from decades of unrealised ambition to actual nuclear delivery when legal reform, political commitment, financing structure and international partnership align.

But it also shows that delivery model matters. The way a project is financed, owned and operated has direct consequences for timeline, control and long-term resilience.

For newcomer countries, that is the central takeaway. Nuclear power is not only an engineering challenge. It is a long-duration strategic undertaking shaped by finance, governance, regulation and international relations. The question is not simply whether a country can start a nuclear project. It is whether it can manage the resulting complexity for the next fifty to sixty years.

That is where success or failure is ultimately decided.

How HKA supports nuclear and complex infrastructure projects

HKA supports owners, developers and contractors on complex energy and infrastructure projects where delay, programme risk and delivery uncertainty intersect. Drawing on deep experience in delay analysis, programming and construction management, our experts are regularly appointed to assess schedule impacts, test critical paths and support the resolution of disputes on high‑value, technically complex projects.

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