When confidence outpaces control: lessons from the MFS collapse

Article

When confidence outpaces control: lessons from the MFS collapse

Katherine Odendaal and Noemi Klein


Three Aston Martins, two Mercedes, six Ferraris and three Rolls-Royces. Just some of the benefits Paresh Raja is alleged to have received as part of what the administrators of Market Financial Solutions (MFS) describe as the “systematic plundering” of £1.3bn, as set out in a High Court claim on 5 May 2026.

The collapse of MFS is not simply another specialist lender failure. It represents  a more uncomfortable type of event: one that sits at the intersection of fraud, anti-money laundering (AML), third party assurance, and indirect risk exposure.[1]  

The issue is not only the scale of losses that have emerged. It is that these losses appear to have crystallised through structures perceived as one step removed from primary credit risk, including sponsor-linked exposures, warehousing arrangements, securitisation channels and collateral reporting frameworks that counterparties may have assumed were already understood or adequately reviewed.[2]

Market Impact

The market reaction has made this difficult to ignore. On 5 May 2026, HSBC disclosed a $400 million fraud-related charge linked to what it described as a “secondary securitisation exposure with a financial sponsor in the UK”, with reporting identifying the underlying exposure as connected to MFS.[3] Barclays had previously disclosed a £228 million impairment linked to the same collapse.[4]

What began as the failure of a Mayfair-based specialist lender has moved beyond a niche insolvency story and into the balance sheets, risk committees and control assessments of major financial institutions. Reporting around the MFS collapse has identified a wider circle of banks and private credit participants with exposure to MFS, or connected structures, reinforcing that the issue extends beyond impairments already recognised.[5]

Regulatory Clarity

That matters because MFS was not a mainstream bank operating within the full Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) perimeter. The FCA has stated that MFS was an Annex 1 firm, meaning it was registered with, and supervised, by the regulator solely for compliance with the Money Laundering Regulations and was not subject to wider FCA scrutiny.[6]

MFS entered administration on 25 February 2026. The FCA opened an enforcement investigation on 20 March 2026.

One of the most important facts in this case is that the scope of FCA supervision was narrower than what many counterparties would assume when they hear that a firm is “FCA supervised”. The distinction also raises further questions about enforcement reach. While Annex 1 firms sit outside the FCA’s full authorisation perimeter, they remain subject to the Money Laundering Regulations and can therefore still face significant supervisory and enforcement action in that context. The practical issue is not whether enforcement exists, but whether market participants fully appreciate the difference in supervisory scrutiny and scope when forming their risk assumptions.

That distinction should not be treated as a technicality. It goes directly to the degree of comfort that banks, sponsors, and counterparties can take from external status labels. An Annex 1 registration is not the same thing as prudential supervision, broader conduct supervision, or a regulatory judgement on the overall soundness of a business model. If institutions treat those categories as interchangeable, they risk importing a false sense of assurance into underwriting, onboarding, and monitoring decisions.

It is tempting to frame MFS as a straightforward fraud event and stop there. That would be too narrow.

Allegations reported around the collapse include potential double pledging of collateral, irregularities in key bank accounts, and significant shortfalls between amounts advanced and collateral apparently available.[7] Whether those allegations are ultimately proven is a matter for the legal process. The more pertinent question from a controls perspective is: what kind of risk management framework allowed risk to travel so far before loss crystallised?

This is precisely why policymakers have been growing more uneasy about private credit and adjacent non-bank lending structures. The Bank of England has launched a system-wide exploratory scenario exercise focused on private markets, noting that private credit and private equity now play a significant role in financing UK companies and real estate.[8] The Financial Stability Board has likewise published a report on vulnerabilities in private credit, highlighting opacity, valuation uncertainty, and deepening ties with banks and insurers.[9]

MFS is therefore not an isolated event. It has emerged in a market already under scrutiny for precisely these structural reasons.

Indirect Risk Transmission

The impairments recognised by banks matter not only because the numbers are large, but because they show how loss transmission can occur indirectly, through sponsors, securitisations, warehouses, and funding structures that can feel one-step removed from the originating risk.

In practice, this means banks should be wary of thinking fraud risk purely resides at the point of origination. In layered structures, the relevant question is whether firms truly understand the control environment around the originator, the integrity of collateral reporting, the independence of servicing flows, and the governance quality of the wider ecosystem through which exposure is carried.

The AML dimension is not peripheral to this story. It is central.

The FCA has been explicit that some Annex 1 firms are still not getting the basics right, and has identified recurring weaknesses, including discrepancies between registered and actual activities, financial crime controls that did not keep pace with growth, poor risk assessments, and inadequate resourcing and oversight.

These findings predate the MFS collapse. They were communicated by the FCA more broadly as part of its supervisory work on Annex 1 firms.[10] The MFS enforcement investigation therefore lands against a backdrop in which the regulator had already warned that this part of the market contains firms with weak AML foundations.

That point should resonate particularly strongly with institutions exposed to real estate backed lending, high-velocity growth, cross-border ownership structures, and higher-risk source of wealth characteristics. In those environments, managing financial crime risk cannot be reduced to onboarding documentation and sanctions screening alone. It has to operate as part of a broader challenge framework. It requires exercising contractual audit rights including:

  • understanding beneficial ownership.
  • testing source of funds plausibility.
  • identifying unusual collateral patterns.
  • validating the commercial rationale of transactions.
  • escalating where business growth begins to outpace the control infrastructure intended to govern it.

When the FCA says some Annex 1 firms have not kept pace with business growth, it is really pointing to a deeper truth: scale can amplify weaknesses faster than governance notices them.

This is where the case becomes especially uncomfortable.

MFS filed accounts up to 31 December 2024 before entering administration in February 2026.[11] This is not an indicator of audit failure, nor should statutory audit be expected to function as a generic anti-fraud or AML examination.

However, audit has a defined scope. So do regulatory reviews. But when a business presents recent accounts that has passed through external assurance processes, and yet shortly afterwards becomes the subject of administration, alleged fraud claims and an FCA enforcement investigation, boards and lenders are entitled to ask a hard question: did assurance provide clarity, or did it merely provide comfort?[12]

That is not a rhetorical distinction. Comfort-led assurance tends to focus on whether a control exists, whether a process is documented, and whether management can evidence a framework. Challenge-led assurance asks tougher questions:

  • Is the data feeding that framework reliable?
  • Are exceptions truly escalated?
  • Can management information be independently reconciled?
  • Is management information sufficiently timely to inform forward looking decisions rather than only understand outcomes retrospectively?
  • Are growth assumptions credible?
  • Does the review scope reflect the actual risk profile rather than the nominal perimeter?

In fast-moving or less transparent environments, that difference becomes decisive.

The public commentary around MFS has also sharpened scrutiny on third-party AML reviews. The Financial Times reported that MFS was given an all clear in a 2024 FCA review, where the relevant law firm reported to the regulator that MFS was complying with the relevant AML rules. That does not, by itself, invalidate the review or establish fault. It does, however, raise a broader question about how regulator mandated reviews are scoped, how much reliance institutions place on them, and whether they are treated as substitutes for ongoing independent judgement across the first, second, and third lines of defence within the firm.

The FCA’s own explanation of the skilled person regime underlines that such reviews are tools to inform supervision, not guarantees of future soundness.[13]

For banks and funders, the MFS collapse should prompt a retest of how indirect fraud and AML exposure is triangulated, identified, and challenged. That means asking whether the evaluation of risk, and the associated risk management frameworks, are sufficiently robust not only for direct borrowers, but also for sponsors, originators, servicers, connected entities and underlying collateral. It means testing whether legal rights over collateral are genuinely exclusive and enforceable, whether cash collections can be independently traced, whether concentrations are visible across structures, and whether warning signs in one part of the relationship are allowed to inform risk appetite definitions and decisions elsewhere.

Where structures are sufficiently layered, institutions can appear diversified while in reality, they are accumulating exposure to the same control weakness through different channels.

Fraud Risk Evolution

For fraud prevention teams, the implication is equally important. The next generation of loss events is unlikely to sit neatly inside a single ‘fraud’ category. More often, the indicators will be distributed across credit, financial crime, legal, audit, operations, servicing, governance, and data quality.

The institutions that respond best will be those that can connect those signals early, challenge apparent control comfort, and investigate quickly before the issue requires a write-down, triggers regulatory investigation, or leads to fines, penalties, and costly remediation.  

The strategic opportunity is not simply to catalogue more red flags or isolated anomalies. It is to surface a common pattern that reveals a deeper structural weakness. Furthermore, the objective is not only early identification, but timely remediation before issues begin to impair a firm’s ability to operate effectively, sustain profitability, or withstand regulatory scrutiny.


[1] Investigation into Market Financial Solutions Limited | FCA

[2] UK Regulator Opens Probe Into Market Financial Solutions After Insolvency – Bloomberg

[3] HSBC Shares Slump 6% on Surprise $400 Million Hit Linked to MFS Collapse

[4] Barclays Eyes Over 50% Recovery on Collapsed UK Firm MFS as Asset Hunt Uncertain – Bloomberg

[5] Wall Street hit by UK mortgage lender collapse, raising fears of more credit ‘cockroaches’ | Reuters

[6] Investigation into Market Financial Solutions Limited | FCA

[7] MFS’s Collapse Refuels Double-Pledging Concerns Within the Private Credit Industry – Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP

[8] Bank of England launches system-wide exploratory scenario exercise focused on private markets | Bank of England

[9] Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit

[10] FCA warns firms over anti-money laundering failings | FCA

[11] MARKET FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS LIMITED filing history – Find and update company information – GOV.UK

[12] DWF LLP | Financial Times

[13]Skilled person reviews | FCA


How HKA can help

For boards, lenders, sponsors and general counsel, the immediate priority is not to produce another generic ‘lessons learned’ list. It is to test where apparent assurance may be masking unexamined exposure. HKA supports clients by:

  • investigating complex fraud concerns
  • examining control breakdowns across all lines of defence
  • testing whether governance, AML frameworks and underwriting align with actual risk.

In practice, that may mean conducting targeted fraud risk reviews across warehouse and securitisation exposures, assessing whether anti-financial crime controls in higher-risk lending ecosystems are proportionate to the business actually being written.

It may also mean investigating how warning signals moved, or failed to move, through committees, reporting lines, and assurance functions, or supporting institutions that need a defensible remediation plan after loss, regulatory scrutiny, or adverse press.

The key question after MFS is not whether this exact pattern will repeat, but it is where else institutions may still be relying on labels, comfort or inherited assumptions when the underlying risk picture  is changing faster than their control framework, management information or assurance model can keep pace. That is often the point at which an advisory conversation becomes most useful, well before a concern matures into an enforcement case, an impairment, or a public challenge about what should have been seen sooner.

Katherine Odendaal

Managing Director

katherineodendaal@hka.com

Expert Profile

Noemi Klein

Director

noemiknein@hka.com

Expert profile


The cost of truth: How reforms and incentives are powering a new era of whistleblowing

Article

The cost of truth: How reforms and incentives are powering a new era of whistleblowing

Katherine Odendaal and Jean Salloum

The global compliance landscape is quietly evolving. A once controversial conclusion is becoming increasingly the norm for policymakers: whistleblowers are not merely a compliance inconvenience to be managed, but rather a strategic asset and a unique source of intelligence to be protected and encouraged. In recent years, a wave of legislative reforms has begun to transform whistleblowing from a passive protection framework into an active enforcement mechanism.

Since 2019, the EU’s approach to whistleblowing has relied on a key pillar: the 2019 EU Whistleblowing Directive. The Directive harmonised minimum protection standards for whistleblowers across member states. However, it did not extend to introducing financial reward mechanisms or proactive enforcement tools.

Two recent EU-level developments will indirectly reinforce the environment in which whistleblowers operate.

  • Firstly, the creation of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA), which is set to be operational in 2028, is a serious step towards tackling fragmented systems. Centralising AML supervision of the 40 highest-risk EU financial institutions means the AMLA will be forming a body that is better set up to respond to disclosures than the current fragmented network of national supervisors.
  • Secondly, the EU’s first comprehensive Anti-Corruption Directive was formally adopted by the European Parliament on 26 March 2026 (with 581 votes for and 21 against). The significance to whistleblowers, albeit indirect, lies in the fact that it establishes a common criminal definition across all EU member states for key offences including bribery, misappropriation, and illicit enrichment. This legal alignment reduces ambiguity, and creates consistent obligations on authorities to address disclosures related to those crimes and more importantly further protects individuals from retaliation for reporting such wrongdoing.

Together, AMLA and the anti-corruption directive signal that the EU is building the foundations for stronger supervision, clearer laws and more effective whistleblowing. These reforms and others have come with a cost.

Sergei Magnitsky died in a Moscow prison in 2009 after exposing a USD230 million tax fraud involving corrupt officials and criminal intermediaries. His death sparked international outrage, leading to the development of ‘Magnitsky-style’ sanctions regimes in the US, UK and EU, forming the cornerstone of anti-corruption enforcement. Despite the prominence of this case, no criminal charges were brought in a Western court for nearly two decades. Only on 30 March 2026 did the Paris Judicial Tribunal consider charges of aggravated money laundering against Russian businessman Dmitry Klyuev.

The growing international consensus on clearer and more homogenous whistleblowing frameworks raises the bar for the UK as it seeks to reform its whistleblowing and anti‑corruption regimes. The UK whistleblowing legislation remains fragmented and largely retrospective, with protection against retaliation routed primarily through employment law under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA), which faced criticism for ‘its limited scope, ineffective enforcement, and failure to protect whistleblowers from significant harm’.

These limitations are illustrated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) joint enforcement action against former Barclays CEO Jes Staley. The GBP642,350 fine, alongside a Barclays clawback of his bonus, arose from Staley’s attempts to identity the author of an anonymous whistleblower letter that raised concerns including an alleged conflict of interest in the recruitment of a senior Barclays executive stemming from a prior personal relationship with Staley. He was also fined by the FCA (imposed in 2023 and upheld in 2025) in relation to misrepresentations made regarding his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. This highlights the UK’s continued reliance on retrospective enforcement action, rather than a preventative culture where protection against retaliation or intimidation is embedded from the outset.

These shortcomings were formally acknowledged in the UK Anti-Corruption Strategy, first published in December 2025. The strategy reframed whistleblowing as a source of actionable intelligence that enhances enforcement outcomes and committed to exploring reform, including the consideration of financial incentives for reporting economic crime. This stance echoes the Serious Fraud Office’s 2025-26 Business Plan, which prioritised the progression of whistleblower incentivisation as part of a broader shift towards intelligence‑led enforcement.

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published research in December 2024 that identified key impacts of whistleblower reward programmes, including increased quantity and quality of actionable intelligence provided to law enforcement, creating an enhanced economic crime deterrent effect, and strengthening private-sector compliance. This challenges what RUSI describes as the UK’s long‑held antipathy toward rewards programmes. Notably, the UK was listed as one of the largest sources of submissions to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, a loss of intelligence abroad highlighted by former SFO Director Nicholas Ephgrave.

This cultural shift is starting to take shape: The UK Employment Rights Act 2025 recognised sexual harassment and a qualifying whistleblowing disclosure, reinforcing the protection mechanisms for individuals. This change is also reflected by the increased regulatory focus by the FCA on non-financial misconduct coming into force on 1 September 2026.

Secondly, from November 2025 the strengthened HMRC Reward Scheme now provides whistleblowers with between 15% and 30% of tax recovered, subject to a minimum recovery threshold of GBP1.5 million from reports of tax evasion, the first time the UK has mirrored the US model in the use of percentage-based incentives.

The United States, which is widely regarded as a pioneer in whistleblower incentivisation, is continuing to expand this method into new territories.

On 30 March 2026, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the US Department of the Treasury, proposed a rule to formally implement a whistleblower programme offering incentives and protections. The stated goal of the rule, dubbed as a “major milestone in implementing whistleblower programme to fight illicit finance”, is to safeguard the integrity of the US’ financial system and national security. FinCEN, which has been accepting tips under the statutory whistleblower programme since 2021, promised that awards could reach 30% of collected monetary penalties under the new rule.

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced in January 2026 that its Antitrust Division, in conjunction with the US Postal Service, made its first whistleblower payment by awarding USD1 million for reporting original information on price-fixing and bid-rigging schemes. The programme, which was launched in July 2025, is therefore showing signs of operational maturity with the DOJ describing whistleblowers as the justice system’s ‘greatest disinfectant against criminal antitrust conspiracies’.

Across jurisdictions, three common themes are emerging as whistleblowing frameworks evolve:

  1. Positive outcomes are shaped by institutional design, including centralisation, clear offence definitions, and empowered enforcement bodies. These structures not only improve enforcement effectiveness, but they can also be decisive in protecting individuals who come forward.
  2. A growing recognition of the value of whistleblowing as a key intelligence function. Driven by a broader cultural shift, insiders are increasingly being recognised as indispensable sources of early evidence in the detection of economic crime; and
  3. Protection alone is often insufficient to cover the risks faced by a whistleblower: both research and practice are showing that financial incentives are improving disclosure quality, deterring misconduct, and preventing the loss of intelligence, including to other jurisdictions.

The reforms outlined above have either been implemented or are set to come into effect in the near term. Firms should review their internal reporting channels to ensure they are fit for purpose, including for multi-jurisdictional reporting spanning AML, bribery, sanctions, tax evasion and workplace misconduct. They should also consider stress testing their investigation protocols, as a mishandled or ignored disclosure is increasingly considered by regulators as evidence of cultural failure.

And, for those holding uncomfortable truths, the landscape continues to shift in their favour, even if the political and legal environments could still pose some challenges.

Katherine Odendaal

Managing Director

katherineodendaal@hka.com

Expert Profile

Jean Salloum

Managing Director

jeansalloum@hka.com


How HKA can help?

As whistleblowing frameworks continue to evolve, organisations should reassess whether their reporting channels, investigation processes and governance structures are fit for an increasingly intelligence‑led enforcement environment. Preparing now can reduce regulatory risk, strengthen culture, and ensure disclosures are handled consistently and defensibly across jurisdictions.

HKA provides an expert, responsive and agile investigations service. Our global capabilities allow us to quickly deploy investigating teams with the right skills, resources and experience anywhere in the world.

Drawing on forensic accounting expertise and a range of complementary disciplines, we conduct incisive investigations and in-depth research. Using specialist investigation technologies, including in-house developed AI capabilities, our renowned teams perform analysis of complex and large datasets, digital forensics, and e-discovery efficiently.

How to get your NEC4 ECC Pay Less Notice right under Y(UK)2, and why it matters

Article

How to get your NEC4 ECC Pay Less Notice right under Y(UK)2, and why it matters

Corrinne McLeish

This article is relevant to NEC4 ECC contracts in the UK where Y(UK)2 applies.[1] That is the payment setup in which many project teams are typically working under, so it is worth being clear about that from the start. Under that payment process, the dates matter, the notices matter, and getting either wrong can cause a much bigger headache than most people think.

At first glance, the process looks simple enough. There is an assessment date. The Contractor applies before that date. The Project Manager certifies within a week. The due date follows. Then comes the final date for payment. If the paying party wants to pay less than the amount in the certificate, it must issue a Pay Less Notice in time and explain sufficiently how it got to its figure. Seems straightforward on paper. Less fun when someone misreads the calendar on a Friday afternoon though!

And this is not a one-off problem. HKA’s latest CRUX report shows that cashflow and payment issues still affect more than one in seven projects worldwide, and more than one in four megaprojects. [2] So this is not just contract admin for the detail-loving few, it is a real business risk.

Why this matters to more than lawyers

It may be easy to think of a Pay Less Notice as administrative paperwork. It is not. It is basic project control and getting it wrong can become a significant headache for all involved.

If the notice is managed properly, it protects the paying party’s position and keeps the conversation where it should be – on the core value of the work. If not, the project can quickly slide into a dispute that has little to do with the actual value and everything to do with someone missing a deadline or issuing a notice that makes no sense. That is an expensive way to learn the importance of clear commercial project control.

That is why Pay Less Notices are not something to leave to the legal team. On most projects, the real difference is made by the Project Managers, commercial teams and operational leads who are running the payment cycle day-to-day. By the time the lawyers are asked to step in, the damage is often already done.

The NEC4 payment cycle: Simple on Paper, easy to get wrong

The basic NEC4 ECC payment cycle under Y(UK)2 is not hard to follow.[3] But it does demand precision.

The assessment date is set in the Contract Data. The Contractor applies before that date. The Project Manager certifies within one week. The due date is seven days after the assessment date. The final date for payment is 14 days after the due date unless the Contract Data changes it. The Pay Less Notice deadline is then worked out by counting back seven days from the final date for payment.

Many teams think of that as Day 0, Day 7, Day 14, and Day 21. That is helpful, but only if everyone is counting from the right date. One of the most common mistakes is counting from the application date instead of the final date for payment. It sounds small but it is not. In payment terms, small mistakes have a habit of growing legs.

What a pay less notice actually needs to do

A Pay Less Notice has a simple job. It needs to state:

  • Clearly what amount the payer says is due; and
  • How that amount has been worked out with details of the calculation provided with the Pay Less Notice and/or reference to a supporting document.

That means the notice should be clear enough that the other side can understand it without playing Sherlock Holmes. If the payer says the amount due is £0, the notice should say £0 clearly. Not hint at it. Not hide it in a spreadsheet. Not expect the reader to work it out from a list of deductions.

It is also practical to label the notice properly. Yes, the courts will look at substance as well as labels, but clear labelling still helps. If you mean “Pay Less Notice,” say “Pay Less Notice.” Life is hard and busy enough without documents playing hide and seek.

Where “smash-and-grab” fits in

The phrase “smash-and-grab” is commonly used to describe a dispute that is won because the payment process has failed, typically because a valid payment notice or Pay Less Notice was not served in time. A failed Pay Less Notice is therefore a common route into that kind of dispute, but not the only one. A staggering 63% of claims are reported to fall into this category.[4]

The important point is that a smash-and-grab dispute is not really about the ‘true’ value of the works. It is about the immediate consequences of a failed payment process. By contrast, a true value dispute is about the substantive valuation. In plain English:

  • Smash-and-grab = “you got the administrative process wrong;” and
  • True value = “let’s work out the real number.”

That distinction matters because the cases keep making the same point: if you want to argue about the right number, you still need to respect the payment process first.

What the cases continue to tell us

The Courts continue to reinforce the same message – if you want to protect your position on value, you must first protect your position on process. Here are some good examples:

  • S&T (UK) Ltd v Grove Developments Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2448: confirmed that a payer can go after the true value but not as a way of skipping over the earlier payment obligation. It also confirmed that a notice can rely on clearly identified supporting material instead of repeating every figure in the notice itself.
  • M Davenport Builders Ltd v Greer & another [2019] EWHC 318 (TCC): reinforced much the same point. If there is a payment obligation arising out of an earlier adjudication, the paying party cannot simply dodge it by racing off to a later true-value adjudication. It must first make the payment required by the first adjudication.
  • Bexheat Ltd v Essex Services Group Ltd [2022] EWHC 936 (TCC): here a late Pay Less Notice meant the payer had to pay the notified sum. ESG could not escape that result by pointing to a valuation argument from a different payment cycle. In short – late means late.
  • Placefirst Construction Ltd v CAR Construction (North East) Ltd [2025] EWHC 100 (TCC): taking a practical approach, the court said that a Pay Less Notice was not automatically invalid just because it was sent before the payment notice deadline. It looked at what the documents were doing in substance, not just what they were called. That is useful, but it is not a licence for carelessness.

How to get it right without making it complicated

The good news is that this is not rocket science. The bad news is that it still requires attention.

  • Own the dates: Someone on the project needs to know the assessment date, due date, final date for payment and Pay Less Notice deadline – not just the theory of it. They need to be in the diary, visible and actively managed by several people. Otherwise, one person being off sick could result in a very big commercial headache.
  • Label the notice clearly: If it is a Pay Less Notice, call it that. It avoids arguments and saves time.
  • Put the amount due on page one: If the payer says £0 is due, say £0. If the payer says £145,000 is due, say £145,000. Do not make the recipient hunt for the answer.
  • Show your workings: A schedule or spreadsheet is fine if it is clear and easy to follow. The recipient should be able to see how the figure was reached.
  • Link deductions to the contract and evidence: If money is being deducted there should be a clear reason with (ideally) reference to the contract and supporting material/contemporaneous evidence to back it up. Unsupported deductions are much easier to challenge.

Where teams usually trip up

Most payment disputes do not begin with a clever legal argument, a complex valuation issue, or a failure of technology. They often begin with ordinary human errors such as someone counting from the wrong date, someone sending a notice too late, someone assuming “finance is dealing with it” or someone attaching (or not!) a complicated spreadsheet that no-one can follow and hoping for the best.

Hope is not a payment strategy.

None of those mistakes sounds dramatic. They are ordinary mistakes with very non-ordinary consequences.

Technology, workflow tools and AI-enabled systems may help by flagging dates, prompting reviews and reducing the risk of missed deadlines but they are only controls, not substitutes for judgement. Someone still needs to understand the contract, verify the dates, check each and every notice, and own the decision being made.

Takeaway point for leaders

The real lesson here is not “be more careful.” It is bigger than that. On NEC4 ECC projects with Y(UK)2, payment discipline is a leadership issue. It sits right in the middle of contract administration, governance and cashflow control. If senior leaders treat it as low-level paperwork, they should not be surprised when it turns into a very high-level problem.

At our recent Infrastructure & Construction roundtable at the RICS London offices with senior female leaders in construction we discussed the IWD 2026 theme of ‘Give to Gain’.[5] I raised the importance of ensuring that the teams on the ground are properly prepared and knowledgeable about why a Pay Less Notice really matters. This responsibility cannot sit solely with the legal or commercial teams. It has to come from the top down. Senior leaders need to set the expectation that payment notices are a core part of commercial governance, make sure teams are sufficiently trained, and insist that contract administration is treated with the same discipline as programme and cost reporting.

The teams that usually avoid these disputes are not necessarily the most legalistic. They are the ones that do the basics well. They own the payment calendar. They use a clear notice template. They train the people closest to the job. They make the numbers easy to follow. None of that is flashy but all of it works.

A Pay Less Notice under NEC4 ECC with Y(UK)2 is not just another box to tick in the monthly payment cycle. It is a quick test of whether the project team is on top of the contract or chasing after it. In a market where payment issues still affect a substantial chunk of distressed projects, that is not a technical detail, it is a leadership issue.


References

[1] Y(UK)2 clause incorporates the UK HGCRA 1996 (as amended)

[2] HKA, CRUX Insight Eighth Annual Report – From Insight to Foresight (November 2025): https://www.hka.com/crux-insight/

[3] NEC4 ECC Core clauses 5

[4] Kings College London, 2024 Construction Adjudication in the United Kingdom: Tracing trends and guiding reform, Professor Renato Nazzini & Aleksander Godhe; page 9

[5] https://www.hka.com/article/from-challenges-to-solutions/


Corrinne McLeish

Director

corrinnemcleish@hka.com

Expert Profile

Corrinne McLeish is a Chartered Quantity Surveyor with over 20 years’ experience in construction, including eight years specialising in dispute resolution. She is an experienced quantum expert, appointed as expert witness eight times and supporting named experts on more than 30 occasions across arbitration, adjudication, litigation, and mediation, on disputes valued up to £197 million.

Corrinne brings strong frontline commercial insight, with deep expertise in contract and commercial management, NEC, and UK statutory adjudication. She holds a master’s in construction law, arbitration and adjudication, is a Fellow of RICS and CIArb, a member of the Adjudication Society, and a Senior Associate of the Academy of Experts. She is actively involved in professional and STEM initiatives, combining technical rigour with a pragmatic, project‑led approach.

How HKA can help?

At HKA, we regularly see the consequences of failed payment processes long before they reach adjudication or the courts. We are appointed on NEC4 projects to review payment cycles, assess the validity of Payment and Pay Less Notices, and support project teams in regaining control of cashflow before disputes escalate.

Our construction experts, quantum specialists, and contract advisors support both employers and contractors to:

  • Review NEC4 payment processes and notice compliance.
  • Stress‑test Pay Less Notices before they are issued.
  • Respond effectively to smash‑and‑grab claims.
  • Embed robust payment discipline into live projects.

If you would like to discuss how your NEC4 ECC payment processes operate in practice, or would value an independent review of your Pay Less Notice procedures under Y(UK)2, we would be happy to talk.

Rethinking global, total cost, and total time claims: viability in a narrowing evidential landscape

Article

Rethinking global, total cost, and total time claims: viability in a narrowing evidential landscape

Dr. Franco Mastrandrea[1]

First published in the ICLR

1. Introduction

There has recently been a marked increase in commentary – across social media, technical journals, and legal discourse – questioning whether global, total cost, and total time claims remain viable in modern construction disputes. Such commentary often descends into broad generalisations, with assertions that global or total cost claims are “not worth the paper they are written on.” Such characterisations are, however, an over‑simplification.

The debate typically arises from a familiar factual pattern. A contractor encounters numerous instructions, variations, or delayed releases of information by or on behalf of the employer under a traditional construction contract. Those matters may interact in complex ways. Their combined effect – whether in delay, disruption, or increased cost – may resist reliable separation into individual cause-and-effect chains. In such circumstances, it is not whether conventional methods of quantification are preferable, but whether the contractor to be denied any meaningful remedy altogether simply because precise segregation has proved impracticable, even impossible.

As a matter of principle, the party asserting a claim bears the burden of establishing both the fact of loss and its extent.[1] Tribunals expect detailed evidence of damages, where it is, or might reasonably have been, available.[2] But it is a mistake to conclude that such expectation is absolute. The law has long recognised that insistence on precision may defeat justice, and that genuine difficulty in assessing damages with certainty does not relieve the wrongdoer of the necessity of paying damages.[3]

It was against that background that global, total cost, and analogous methodologies emerged, as pragmatic responses to the sorts of circumstances in which conventional cause‑and‑effect quantification was rendered impracticable, if not impossible.

At the same time, the context in which such claims are advanced has changed materially. Advances in project management, cost control systems, record keeping, and increasingly sophisticated delay and disruption analysis techniques have significantly narrowed the circumstances in which such methodologies can properly be deployed, while judicial and arbitral scrutiny has intensified across common‑law jurisdictions.

This paper argues that global, total cost, and total time claims remain legally viable, but within increasingly narrower circumstances. They are no substitute for proper particularisation where it is available, and they carry substantial forensic risk. Their continuing relevance lies primarily as methodologies to be deployed where conventional claims are genuinely impracticable, and where strict evidential pre‑conditions cannot reasonably be satisfied.

2. Clarified Typology of Claims

Types of Construction Claim

Construction claims can be broadly categorised, analytically, by reference to how causation and effect are asserted. Although these categories are sometimes conflated in practice,[4] it is important to distinguish them:

  • Type 1 – Conventional claims:
    Individual causes are alleged to give rise to identifiable individual effects.
  • Type 2 – Global claims:
    A collection of causative events, all attributed to the defendant, is said to have produced a single composite effect, without individual attribution of loss to specific events.
  • Type 3 – Total cost claims:
    A single overall pecuniary loss is attributed to one or more causes said to be the defendant’s responsibility.
  • Type 4 – Total time claims:
    A single overall period of delay (whether project-wide or localised)[5] is attributed to one or more causative events said to be the defendant’s responsibility.
  • Type 5 – Apportioned claims:
    A proportion of an overall delay or cost overrun within a broader constellation of events is attributed by the claimant to the defendant.

In practice, claims may combine elements of more than one category. Many disputes surrounding global and total cost claims arise at the pleadings stage,[6] where defendants commonly contend that the claimant has failed to articulate a case with sufficient particularity to permit a fair trial.[7]

As will emerge, jurisdiction matters.

3. Global Claims

(a) Nature and Rationale

A global claim is one in which the claimant asserts that multiple, often interacting, events for which the defendant is responsible collectively caused a composite loss, without attempting to allocate specific heads of loss to individual events. Its doctrinal acceptance reflects an acknowledgment that certain consequences of construction delay/disruption resist precise analytical separation.

The modern recognition of such claims can be traced to J Crosby & Sons Ltd v Portland UDC, where the court accepted that, in circumstances of complex interaction between employer‑driven events, precise attribution of individual cost consequences might be impracticable.[8] That approach was subsequently endorsed and refined in London Borough of Merton v Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd [9]and John Holland Construction & Engineering Pty Ltd v Kvaerner RJ Brown Pty Ltd,[10] emphasising that recoverability depends on genuine impracticability rather than evidential convenience.

(b) Judicial Acceptance and Boundaries

The acceptance of global claims has never been unqualified. Courts have consistently emphasised that such claims may only succeed where the claimant can establish that it is impossible or impracticable to disentangle individual causative contributions.

(c) Forensic Risk

A global claim is inherently fragile. Proof that a material contributing cause of loss lies outside the defendant’s responsibility may be fatal to the claim as advanced. Defendants are therefore incentivised to focus not merely on disproving particular events, but on demonstrating the existence of an alternative material cause.

Conclusion:
Global claims remain admissible in principle, but their success depends upon an exacting evidential foundation. They are a high‑risk forensic strategy rather than a shortcut to recovery.

4. Total Cost Claims

(a) Methodology and Attraction

The total cost method calculates loss by comparing the claimant’s actual costs with its estimated or tendered costs, attributing the difference to the defendant’s alleged breaches. Its attraction lies in its apparent simplicity, but that same simplicity conceals significant assumptions in the claimant’s favour.

(b) Judicial Suspicion and the Four‑Part Test

Courts have consistently treated total cost claims with scepticism. The prerequisites commonly articulated are that:

  1. it is impossible or highly impracticable to determine loss by more precise means;
  2. the claimant’s original estimate or tender was reasonable;
  3. the claimant’s actual costs were reasonable; and
  4. the claimant was not responsible for the additional costs.

Each element presents a substantial evidential obstacle, particularly where records could have been maintained but were not.

(c) Practical Consequences

In practice, total cost claims frequently fail not because loss cannot be shown, but because claimants are unable or unwilling to expose their tender build‑up, justify their cost overruns, or confront inefficiencies in performance.

A recurrent reason for rejection of such claims is the contractor’s failure to keep or present adequate contemporaneous records where such records could reasonably have been maintained. Courts have consistently refused to allow the total cost method to remedy evidential deficiencies of the claimant’s own making.[11]

Conclusion:
Total cost claims are legally permissible but evidentially vulnerable in practice. They are typically tolerated only where more conventional approaches are genuinely unavailable, not merely inconvenient (albeit that yet further latitude may be extended to claimants where the justice of the case seems to demand it: see section 6 below). There is here a tension between epistemic impossibility (i.e., records genuinely unavailable or interactions genuinely inseparable) and forensic inconvenience (e.g., where records do or could exist but are deliberately or inexcusably not kept.)[12]

5. Total Time Claims

Total time claims mirror total cost claims in structure, but apply to delay rather than cost. [13] Courts have consistently rejected approaches that merely compare planned and actual completion dates and attribute the whole overrun to a collection of alleged employer risks.[14]

A recurring weakness lies in the assumption that the baseline programme is realistic. Without rigorous scrutiny of the original programme’s integrity, a total time claim rests on unstable foundations.

From a practical perspective:

  • global EOT claims may sometimes function defensively, to resist liquidated damages;
  • claims for prolongation costs require far greater precision, given the need to exclude culpable and excusable delays and to locate them precisely in time.

Conclusion:
Total time claims are no less problematic than total cost claims and carry similar risks of wholesale failure.

6. What Happens If the Claim Fails?

Residual and Modified Approaches

Where a claimant fails to meet the strict prerequisites for global or total cost recovery, courts have occasionally resorted to modified total cost,[15] jury verdict, or apportionment approaches to avoid conferring a windfall on the defendant.

Take the following illustrative example, from the writer’s own experience:

A Contractor made a claim against an Employer for disruption on a total cost basis in relation to a new, multi-storey, bank headquarters development. As so often happens, quantum experts were appointed very late in the day; pleadings in the dispute had closed, and extensive disclosure had been given. A check of the costs incurred by the Contractor for the various elements of work by the quantum expert appointed by the Contractor (the writer) showed a dramatic, and unexplained, discrepancy between anticipated and actual costs for the plastering trade. The Contractor had made no contemporaneous complaints against the Employer about matters which might adversely have affected the costs in that trade. Nor was the Contractor’s pricing for that work low, in any objective sense. When interrogated, the Contractor’s personnel could not initially understand why such a dramatic discrepancy between anticipated and actual costs in that trade should exist. Further probing by the writer revealed that the Contractor had experienced difficulties in carrying out the slip-formed service core. This resulted in an out of tolerance structure. Those discrepancies had, in the event, been taken up by dubbing out and plastering. The problem had sub-consciously been suppressed by those who had resolved it on site, at much greater cost, at the time. An adjustment for this deficiency in performance was made in the writer’s expert report and the remainder excess over anticipated cost claim successfully pursued.

As for apportionment, the Scottish Inner House in John Doyle Construction Ltd. v. Laing Management (Scotland) Ltd[16] invoked both these concepts in endorsing (at [16]) the lower court’s conclusion at [38] that, even though the global claim as such would fail, apportionment of the loss between the causes for which the employer was responsible and other causes was available according to the relative importance of the various causative events in producing the loss. This was so as long as the employer’s cause was a material cause of the loss, and even where the other causes were non-compensable or at the risk of the contractor (such as cases of truly concurrent delay in the sense that both causes operated together at the same time to produce a single consequence).If, by contrast, the other concurrent cause was the contractor’s fault, an apportioned claim may be inappropriate. Other jurisdictions have not embraced apportionment,[17] including, it seems, the current of judicial thinking in England in the absence of an express contractual apportionment mechanism.[18] This is so albeit that apportionment was directed by Salmon LJ (as he then was) in relation to the delay claim in the earlier Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd. v. McKinney Foundations Ltd.[19] something perhaps unsurprising given the then absence of the use of tools such as critical path analysis in the investigation of delay claims. Whether Scottish courts will admit the use of apportionment of even culpable delays in global claims is yet to be definitively decided, but would seem on the cards given its admission in conventional delay claims in City Inn Ltd. v. Shepherd Construction Ltd.[20] Other, particularly, but not exclusively,[21] civil law, jurisdictions, seem more amendable to apportionment on the basis of contributory fault, notions of equity, or preventing unjust enrichment of the defendant.

7. Summary and Conclusions

The law continues to recognise that difficulty in quantification should not relieve a wrongdoer from liability. However, global, total cost, and total time claims now operate within a much narrower sphere than they once did.

Managerial, technological, and analytical advances mean that tribunals increasingly expect claimants to particularise causation and loss with precision. As a result:

  • conventional claims remain the preferred and safest route to recovery;
  • global and total cost claims are exceptional tools of last resort;
  • claimants pursuing such claims must expect intense scrutiny of estimates, records, and performance; and
  • defendants are well‑advised to identify alternative causes and claimant inefficiencies.

Where global, total cost, or total time claims are pursued, claimants should proactively identify and concede those elements of loss for which they are responsible and claim only the balance. Failure to do so exposes the entire claim to collapse.

Nevertheless, global, total cost, and total time claims remain legally viable.


References

[1] McGregor on Damages, 22nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2024, Chapter 11.

Cf. Griffin v. Colver 16 NY 489 (1858) for a seminal New York case, in which Selden J for the Court of Appeals of New York said, at pp. 494-5:

‘The damages must be… certain, both in their nature and in respect to the cause from which they proceed.’

[2]See, for example, Foaminol Laboratories Ltd. v. British Artid Plastics [1941] 2 All ER 393 in which Hallett J said, in relation to a claim for loss of goodwill not precluded from recovery:

‘There are many cases in which the quantifying of the pecuniary loss is extremely difficult and the judge has to do the best he can. Here, however,…I have no material which enables me to put any figure at all upon that pecuniary loss…’

Cf. Nestlé v. National Westminster Bank Plc [1994] 1 All ER 118; the claim for loss of interest by reason of the absence of improved credit control in The Salvage Association v. CAP Financial Services [1995] FSR 654 (successfully challenged on some of the findings of fact at 1993 WL 13005057). Whilst the claim was in any event too remote, the evidence was, according to Thayne Forbes J at p. 684: ‘…much too speculative and insufficient to prove such a claim.’

[3] Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786, per Vaughan Williams LJ, at p. 792.

Cf. Fink v. Fink [1946] 74 CLR 127, at p. 143, in which Dixon and McTiernan JJ. said:

‘Where there has been an actual loss of some sort, the common law does not permit difficulties of estimating the loss in money to defeat the only remedy it provided for breach of contract, an award of damages’;

Brirek Industries Pty Ltd v. McKenzie Group Consulting (Vic.) Pty Ltd. (No. 2) [2015] VSCA 185, at [43].

[4] See, for example, John Sisk & Son Ltd. v. Carmel Building Services Ltd (In Administration) [2016] EWHC 806 (TCC), from [47].

[5] For a consideration of the differences between such claims, see Franco Mastrandrea, Localised Delays: The Poor Relation in Construction Claims?, [2023] The International Construction Law Review 112.

[6] See, for example, Wharf Properties and Another v. Eric Cumine Associates and Others (1991) 52 BLR 1, PC.

Cf. John Holland Construction & Engineering Pty. Ltd. v. Kvaerner RJ Brown Pty. Ltd. and another (1997) 82 BLR 81; Alexanderson Earthmover Pty. Ltd. v. Civil Mining & Construction Pty. Limited [2020] QSC 122; TTJ Design and Engineering Pte Ltd. v. Chip Eng Seng Contractors (1988) Pte. Ltd. [2011] SGHC 12.

[7] See, for example, British Airways Pension Trustees Ltd. v. Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd. (1995) 72 BLR 26, per Saville LJ at p. 33I-34C.

[8] (1967) 5 BLR 121, at p. 136.

[9] (1985) 32 BLR 51, at p. 102.

[10] (1997) 82 BLR 81.

[11] See, for example, Propellex Corp v Acting Secretary for the Army 342 F3d 1335 (Fed Cir 2003).

[12] Thus, it was noted by the Court of Claims in WRB Corp. et al v. United States 183 Ct. Cl. 409 (1968) that the contractor’s only excuse for the failure to maintain accurate cost records during performance was that it did not expect to become involved in litigation over the project, concluding at p. 426 that that ‘…was a feeble justification for taking refuge in the total-cost approach.’

[13]For a decision considering this approach see Ipex ITG Pty Ltd. v. Melbourne Water Corp. (No. 3) [2006] VSC 83, setting out at [26] its affinity with a total costs claim and the steps in such a claim, and concluding, at [29], that a similar attitude underlay the reluctance of the Court to permit those cases to go forward unless a more conventional form of presentation is shown to be unavailable or impracticable.

Cf. CIMIC Morningstar Investments Ltd. v. Chandos Construction Ltd., 2026 BCCA 2; French Construction, LLC v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 2022 WL 3134507.

[14] See, for example, Bruno Law v. United States195 Ct.Cl. 370 (1971), noting, at p. 382:

‘‘(The plaintiff contractor) simply takes the original and extended completion dates, computes therefrom the intervening time or overrun, points to a host of individual delay incidents for which defendant (employer) was allegedly responsible and which ‘contributed’ to the overall extended time, and then leaps to the conclusion that the entire overrun time was attributable to defendant… Such proof of delay is ordinarily as unsatisfactory as the “total cost” method of proving damages. “A ‘total time’ approach is no less susceptible to inaccuracies than the total-cost theory.’

[15] See, for example, McDougald Construction Co. v. Unites Sates 122 Ct. Cl. 210 (1952).

For the sorts of adjustments that may appropriately be made to a total costs claim, see Thalle Construction Co. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. 945 F.Supp. 652 (1996).

[16] [2004] ScotCS 141.

[17] See, for example, the New South Wales Court of Appeal case of Mainteck Services Pty. Ltd. v. Stein Heurtey SA [2014] NSWCA 184.

[18] Such as was provided for, but in which no case based on that express mechanism was properly advanced, in Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Disclosure and Barring Service [2024] EWHC 2025 (TCC), per Constable J at [104].

[19] (1970) 1 BLR 111, CA, at p. 119: See Franco Mastrandrea, Concurrent Causation in Construction Claims, [2009] The International Construction Law Review 75, at pp. 96-97.

[20] [2010] ScotCS CSIH_68.

[21] See, for some common law examples in the broader law, Foundation Co. of Canada v. United Grain Growers Ltd. (1995) 25 CLR (2d) 1; Ribic v. Weinstein (1984) 47 OR(2d) 126; Crescendas Bionics Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd. [2021] SGHC 189.


Dr. Franco Mastrandrea

Partner

francomastrandrea@hka.com

Expert Profile

Dr. Franco Mastrandrea is a Chartered Quantity Surveyor and Chartered Arbitrator with over 40 years of experience in the construction industry. He has acted as expert on more than 50 international project management, delay and quantum-related disputes.

From London to Australia and Canada to Antarctica, Franco has extensive and diverse dispute resolution expertise. With an established record in drafting, interpreting and applying commercial terms in contracts, he successfully combines both knowledge and experience under traditional cross-examination and hot-tubbing.

Franco’s expert commissions cover a wide range of industries including oil and gas in Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, North Africa and South East Asia; transport infrastructure in the Caribbean and the UK; power generation, from CCGT to windfarms, in the UK; and numerous building and infrastructure projects around the world.


Interview: The rising scrutiny of expert evidence

News

Interview: The rising scrutiny of expert evidence

HKA’s Paris leadership recently spoke with Décideurs on the rapidly evolving litigation and arbitration landscape, highlighting the firm’s accelerating growth in France and the intensifying debates around expert evidence.

In the wide‑ranging conversation, Patrick Hébréard, Matthias Cazier‑Darmois, Florent Myara and Jean Salloum explore how Paris has become a strategic pillar in HKA’s international development, driven by increasing demand for high‑quality financial, economic and forensic expertise in complex disputes.

They discuss a market marked by greater technical sophistication, tougher cross‑examinations and heightened scrutiny of expert methodologies. These are trends that are reshaping expectations of expert witnesses across arbitration and judicial proceedings alike.

The interview also examines the growing role of forensic investigations, data analytics and artificial intelligence, as well as the emergence of third‑party funding as a factor broadening access to justice.

Together, these developments underline the importance of integrated, cross‑disciplinary expertise in today’s disputes environment.

Source Décideurs: Interview by Mathilde Aymami


Patrick Hébréard

Partner

patrickhebreard@hka.com

Expert Profile


Matthias Cazier-Darmois

Partner

matthiascazierdarmois@hka.com

Expert Profile


Jean Salloum

Principal

jeansalloum@hka.com


Florent Myara

Director

florentmyara@hka.com

From challenges to solutions

Article

From challenges to solutions

How design, collaboration and technology can shape a better future for infrastructure projects

It was a pleasure to welcome senior leaders from across the construction and engineering sector to our first Infrastructure Connect Roundtable in London on Wednesday, 11 March 2026. As a nod to International Women’s Day, our all-female group gathered under the Chatham House Rule, creating the conditions for a conversation that was open, honest and deeply insightful.

While the discussion did not shy away from the challenges the industry continues to face, it was notably forward looking. Participants shared not only candid reflections on current pressures, but also a strong sense of optimism about what could be achieved in the decade ahead. What struck most was the breadth of experience in the room, and a shared willingness to move beyond diagnosis and toward constructive thinking.
Across organisations, disciplines and perspectives, a common theme emerged: we have an extraordinary opportunity to shape the future of infrastructure through better design, stronger collaboration and the intelligent use of technology.

Where the challenges lie in today’s infrastructure landscape

The importance of supporting early, robust design

A consistent theme was the central importance of robust, well-developed design to overall project performance and the need for the design process to be properly supported from the outset. Unclear scope definition, late design changes, and limited investment in early design development continue to place pressure on programmes and budgets. There was broad agreement that earlier contractor involvement, a willingness to draw on the expertise of designers and engineers throughout the process, and a more rigorous focus on developing design detail at the outset could significantly improve predictability and overall project outcomes.

Risk and trust, allocation remain uneven

Participants also highlighted persistent challenges around trust and risk allocation across the supply chain. Contractors and subcontractors are frequently required to operate within contractual frameworks that allocate risk unevenly and offer limited opportunity to redress that balance. Combined with tight margins and a pressure to mobilise quickly, cash-flow is at risk and bankruptcy (whether actual or potential) is a real possibility, particularly for those further down the supply chain.

The gap between contract and delivery

Disputes were often linked to misalignment between contractual requirements and the realities of day-to-day delivery. Unclear, or out-of-date baseline programmes, constrained budgets, incomplete project documentation, and the practical challenges of administering complex contracts all continue to hinder timely and effective delivery. And, while technology is recognised as an important enabler, there was a clear consensus that it must compliment, not replace, strong fundamentals in planning, capability, and governance.

The discussion closed with a shared desire for improvement. Earlier engagement, appropriate resourcing, fairer risk allocation, and meaningful investment in design were identified as essential steps toward healthier, more collaborative project environments. Ultimately, participants agreed that successful delivery depends not only on contractual structures, but also on fostering trust, transparency, and genuine collaboration across all parties.

Resetting behaviours and mindsets

Changing how we work, not just what we deliver

The second part of the conversation focused on how behaviours and mindsets might be reset to improve project delivery, from conception through to completion.

Despite decades of experience, many of the same challenges persist: a lack of collaboration, incomplete design, unrealistic pricing, misaligned programmes, supply chain pressures, and the inconsistent understanding and management of contracts.

Much of this was attributed not to process failure but to culture, and specifically a lack of trust, decision-making driven by incomplete or poor advice, and an ingrained reluctance to speak truth to power.

Participants identified several avenues for positive change. (i) Earlier and more open collaboration; clearer understanding and fairer allocation of risk; (ii) the use of contractual frameworks that are fit for purpose and the project team can understand and use in practice; and (iii) improved interaction between legal, commercial, design and delivery teams throughout all stages of the project.

There was also strong support for encouraging ‘softer’ leadership skills around empathy, communication and true collaboration as enablers for better outcomes.

Looking ahead to a smarter and more inclusive future

The combined power of technology and human intelligence

We concluded our discussion with a look ahead to how the industry might evolve by 2036. Would it simply be more of the same, or would some degree of meaningful change have taken hold?

There was agreement around the table that technology, and AI in particular, will transform the construction and infrastructure industry over the next decade. From an increase in the use of large language models and advanced common data environments, to the deployment of reality-capture technologies to create accurate, contemporaneous and time‑stamped records of activity and progress.

Yet long-standing barriers around trust, openness, collaboration and data sharing must also evolve in parallel. The idea of AI becoming more “big mother”, rather than “big brother”, resonated, capturing hopes for technology that supports, rather than observes, enabling industry to extract the huge benefits of innovation, without losing the human judgement and relationships which are critical to success, particularly in an industry as complex and crucial as construction.

A recurring question was how technology might automate routine tasks such as progress tracking, defect identification, and compliance reporting to enable construction professionals to focus on higher‑value activities like risk management, stakeholder coordination, and strategic decision-making.

Participants were clear that technology alone will not be enough. Without the cultural change, greater flexibility in contracting, stronger collaboration between lawyers and engineers from the outset, and a genuine commitment to learn from past experience its potential will remain constrained.

Looking ahead to 2026 and beyond, there was an optimism that a greater diversity of gender, age, experience, background and skills would increasingly shape the industry. With it comes the opportunity for different ways of thinking and acting, more collaborative working practices, and more realistic, workable solutions, ultimately supporting a more resilient, inclusive and forward-looking infrastructure sector that touches our everyday lives.

Roundtable participants from HKA: Experts, hosts and contributing authors

Amanda Clack

Partner and CEO International

amandaclack@hka.com

Karen Best

Partner

karenbest@hka.com

Expert Profile

Helen Collie

Partner

helencollie@hka.com

Expert Profile

Kirsteen Cacchioli

Principal

kirsteencacchioli@hka.com

Expert Profile

Corrinne McLeish

Director

CorrinneMcLeish@hka.com

Expert Profile

Sarah Keyte

Technical Director

SarahKeyte@hka.com

Expert Profile

Alekya Musunuru

Senior consultant

AlekyaMusunuru@hka.com

The roundtable was chaired by HKA Partner and International CEO, Amanda Clack, supported by HKA’s construction, infrastructure and technical experts. If you are interested in joining a future roundtable please email eventsuk@HKA.com

On thin ice: Financial crime risk in the Appointed Representative model

Article

On thin ice: Financial crime risk in the Appointed Representative model

By Priya Giuliani

The Appointed Representative (AR) model is an established feature of the UK regulatory landscape and plays a legitimate role in enabling firms to broaden distribution, innovation and scale. However, by its very design, the model places firms on inherently thin ice from a financial crime perspective.

When regulated activity is carried out at arm’s length, by entities that themselves are not authorised, the principal firms behind them face a structural amplification of risk. Financial crime exposure in AR networks is not simply a function of poor behaviour by individual ARs; it arises from distance, delegation and scale. Without sustained oversight, the ice may appear solid on the surface whilst dangerous weaknesses form below.

The AR model: A fragile surface

An AR is not directly authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA0. Instead, it carries on regulated activity under the permissions of its principal, which retains full regulatory responsibility for the AR’s conduct. That responsibility is absolute and non‑delegable. No contractual arrangement, policy allocation or reliance on AR attestations alters where regulatory accountability sits.

The FCA has recently reinforced this point in its work on inactive ARs[1], reiterating that responsibility for ARs rests firmly with the principal. The guidance makes clear that inactivity does not dilute accountability. Where AR activity is limited, or has ceased, this places greater importance on the principal’s ability to maintain an accurate, up‑to‑date understanding of its AR population.

The AR regime plays an important part in the provision of financial services allowing a broader range of providers to enter the market and therefore aligning to the Government’s and regulators’ objectives of promoting competition (and consumer choice), supporting innovation, and contributing to economic growth. From a firm’s perspective, using ARs allow extension of reach and cost efficiency. In 2024, ARs generated £11.1bn in regulated revenue from financial services.[2]

In recent years, the FCA has tightened the AR regime through the introduction of new rules[3] and has kept it top of mind as evidenced by the Government’s recent consultation[4] which identifies weaknesses in AR oversight as a key driver of consumer detriment. The FCA, through its supervisory work, considers risks to consumers higher where services are delivered through ARs than directly authorised firms, and it is focussed on strengthening principal firm oversight of ARs.

The scale of the AR model: Why the risk exposure is material

The AR population has grown significantly from the inception of the model in 1986 reaching approximately 34,000 active ARs in September 2025.[5] To put this into context, the latest figures show that the FCA supervises around 16,000 firms for AML (less than half the total AR population).[6] It falls squarely on the principal to ensure their ARs are adhering to AML requirements.

The FCA’s data shows that there were approximately 2,500 principals in September 2025; an average of 13 ARs to one principal. This concentration of responsibility means that a small number of principals act as regulatory choke points for large AR populations, materially increasing financial crime, governance, and operational risk.

Stress fractures beneath the surface

In practice, failures rarely stem from an absence of policies. They arise where principals cannot independently see or test how controls are executed at AR level.

Principal firms’ inherent risks increase through the use of ARs as the firm is  one step removed from the customer and often rely on ARs to conduct key financial crime controls, such as client onboarding. The ARs themselves are not regulated, any failure by the ARs becomes the responsibility of the principal. Accountability cannot be transferred.

As shown above, the FCA data indicates, on average, that one principal can have many ARs. Unless the principal determines a minimum standard for controls execution, the potential variability in AR frameworks creates risks in oversight.

When the ice breaks: Common financial crime themes

The FCA’s findings on financial crime failures with corporate finance firms sheds some light into AR failures.[7] It found that 29% of principal firms assessed did not conduct financial crime risk assessments of their ARs, and 19% of principal firms did not assess the effectiveness of their own oversight and control mechanisms for AR financial crime risks.

The findings further revealed that some firms did not conduct on-site visits or other audits of their ARs, nor did they independently investigate the reports they receive from ARs concerning financial crime controls or incidents. This creates a blind reliance on AR self‑reporting and significantly increases the likelihood that financial crime issues remain undetected under the surface until triggered by regulatory intervention.

There is no reason to believe that the AR population would not exhibit the same AML failures as directly supervised firms, including inadequate customer due diligence, risk assessments and ongoing monitoring. In AR environments, these weaknesses can enable high‑risk introducer‑led business, inconsistent customer due diligence across ARs, delayed SAR escalation and increased sanctions exposure through overseas activity.

Testing the ice: What good looks like

The FCA is clear. Principal firms are accountable for their AR networks. They are expected to manage these networks responsibly and conduct higher standards of due diligence. Trusted relationships cannot replace objective due diligence. Firms must maintain rigorous, objective financial crime controls rather than relying on the length of a relationship, or personal trust as a justification for bypassing checks.

The FCA is focused on strengthening principal firm oversight of ARs to prevent harm to consumers and markets.[8] This should include:

  • Board‑level ownership of AR risk, including financial crime risk
  • Inclusion of the AR channel in business-wide risk assessments
  • Risk‑based AR segmentation driving differentiated oversight
  • Clear policies and procedures for managing financial crime risks introduced through ARs
  • Robust onboarding and pre‑appointment due diligence
  • Regular financial crime reviews, beyond box‑ticking, and not over relying on AR attestations
  • Consideration of the AR culture to identify risk factors that could increase financial crime risk such as volume-driven sales models, rapid growth without corresponding increase in controls, and weak compliance culture
  • Clear, enforced consequences for control failures

Stronger AR oversight is not about thicker rulebooks; it is about knowing, at any moment, where the ice is weakest.

ARs are a business choice. Financial crime risk is not optional

The FCA’s goal is to ensure that while the AR regime enables innovation and growth, it does not become a weak point that bad actors can exploit. The AR model is commercially attractive, but risk ownership remains firmly with the principal. When AR controls fail, it is the principal that falls through the ice, regardless of where the failure originated.

Those that treat AR oversight as a compliance formality are likely to be exposed. Those that embed robust, risk‑based supervision will be better placed with regulators and clients alike.

Innovation may skate ahead, but accountability stays where the ice breaks.

References:

[1] Managing potential risks from inactive appointed representatives | FCA

[2] Appointed representatives data | FCA

[3] Principal firms embedding the new rules for effective appointed representative oversight: Good practice and areas for improvement | FCA

[4] Consultation: The Appointed Representatives Regime – GOV.UK – closed on 9 April 2026

[5] Appointed representatives data | FCA

[6] 24-25_Annual_Report_.pdf

[7] Financial crime controls in corporate finance firms: survey findings | FCA

[8] Principal firms embedding the new rules for effective appointed representative oversight: Good practice and areas for improvement | FCA


About the Author:

Priya Giuliani

Partner

priyagiuliani@hka.com

Expert Profile

Priya Giuliani is a specialist in financial crime investigations & compliance with nearly 30 years’ experience, including a decade as a Partner. She specialises in helping clients on a proactive basis to assess and manage the risk of financial crime including assessing governance, oversight, conduct, and training Senior Managers and Boards. Her investigative experience provides insight in to how various financial crime types (e.g. money laundering, terrorist and proliferation financing, sanctions and tax evasion, bribery, corruption and fraud) can occur, including through the use of professional enablers, and the controls required to manage these risks effectively. Priya has been appointed on many Skilled Person engagements. Widely regarded as a well-qualified and highly experienced expert in financial crime risk management and investigations. She understands risk well and works with clients to assess and develop proportionate and effective control frameworks.


This article presents views, thoughts or opinions that are provided for general information purposes only. It does not represent the views of, or constitute advice of any form (legal, professional or otherwise) from, HKA or any of its affiliates. While HKA takes reasonable care to ensure the accuracy of its contents at the time of publication, the article does not deal with all aspects of the referenced subject matter and may not be relied upon as a substitute for professional judgement or independent analysis. Accordingly, neither HKA nor the author accepts liability for any use of, or reliance on, the information presented in the article. This article is protected by copyright © 2026 HKA Global, LLC/© 2026 HKA Global Ltd. All rights reserved.

What makes a good claim? Ten principles for credible claims in construction and engineering

Article

What makes a good claim? Ten principles for credible claims in construction and engineering

by Kirsteen Cacchioli

I have seen many claims over the years, some of which have been well prepared, but many of which have not. A good construction or engineering claim is built through disciplined thinking, robust evidence and a clear understanding of how contractual rights translate into recoverable entitlement, but this is very often not the case.

And in a world where technology prevails, and AI can generate (or hallucinate!) all manner of data and “insight”, as well as assisting with presentation, it’s important to remember that AI and technology alone cannot replace the judgement, structure and scrutiny required to prepare a credible and persuasive claim.

So what are the key ingredients of a good claim? The most effective claims share common characteristics: they are grounded in the contractual and legal framework, informed by those who lived the project, supported by contemporaneous records, and communicated through a clear, objective narrative. They apply consistent methodology, acknowledge weaknesses, focus on what truly matters from a recovery perspective, and have undergone challenge and refinement.

Ten principles for a strong construction claim

The ten principles set out below reflect these fundamentals. Taken together, they provide a practical framework for preparing claims that are not only technically sound, but also proportionate, defensible and ultimately more likely to succeed.

  1. Know the contractual and legal matrix for your claim
    Understand what your rights and obligations are, where your entitlement might lie, and what you need to demonstrate in order to successfully pursue that entitlement. Prioritise this understanding from the outset and keep this as a key focal point throughout the preparation of the claim.
  2. Lean into the project team
    A good claim relies on the contemporaneous experience and understanding of the team who were there at the time. “Boots on the ground” knowledge of the project, the context of the claim, and the critical detail is invaluable.
  3. Gather your data
    Site diaries, photographs, drone footage, programmes, cost records, progress reports, WhatsApp chats, instructions, change orders… the list goes on! Know what information you have (and what you are missing). There remains no substitution for contemporaneous records to support a claim.
  4. Develop a clear and coherent narrative
    Draft a strong and logically-structured narrative, and present it in a way which is easy to follow for someone who is unfamiliar with the project and the issues at hand. If a claim is difficult to read, hard to follow or requires too much effort to understand, the momentum behind the claim can be quickly lost. Take your reader with you and don’t assume a level of understanding which is not there – explain things clearly and provide plenty of signposting along the way.  
  5. Reference and present supporting documentation clearly
    Provide clear reference points to supporting documentation and ensure that documentation is easy to identify, access and navigate. If information is too hard to find, or too difficult to interpret or review, the strength of the claim is undermined regardless of its merits.
  6. Ensure the claim remains objective and fact-based
    Avoid emotive language and sense check the submission. Having the claim stress-tested by a pair of “fresh eyes” can be invaluable.  It is all too easy for a project team, or indeed the wider business, to become overly invested in a single version of events and to believe their own truth. Independent challenge can help guard against bias or oversight.  Consider engaging specialists where appropriate, particularly if the claim is technical in nature or of particular magnitude or importance.
  7. Be consistent in your approach and methodology
    Consistency is critical. Don’t cherry-pick data, or how you interpret and use that data. If different analyses tell different stories, or if there is credit to be accounted for, then acknowledge it. Disputes are rarely one sided, and being willing to acknowledge internal weaknesses and issues which may have contributed to the dispute is essential to the strength of a claim. Any inconsistencies will undoubtedly be identified by the opposing party if left unaddressed.  It’s far better to be prepared ahead of time than to be caught on the back foot.
  8. Consider all angles
    Be open minded to alternative approaches and strategies. There are often different ways of approaching the same issue, some of which may be more appropriate to the claim in question.  A creative approach might be exactly what is required in certain circumstances – just because something worked a particular way before does not mean it is the best approach now. Past practice should inform decisions, but not dictate them. The most appropriate approach needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis for each individual claim and the outcome the business is looking to achieve.
  9. Follow the money 
    Very often, substantial amounts of time and effort can be wasted on issues that are weak contractually, or that simply will not result in meaningful cost (or time) recovery given the effort involved. Focus on the elements of the claim that matter – “keep your eyes on the prize”… “cash is king”… “show me the money”…  All the old adages still apply! And finally… 
  10. Don’t underestimate the time and effort involved in preparing a claim
    Give yourself adequate time to gather the facts, address missing data, analyse the detail, and develop the submission.  Then give yourself more time to question (or be questioned on) the claim, to address those questions properly, and to be prepared for opposing arguments. Preparing a claim is not a quick process – and if it is, the chances are it will probably fail…

Kirsteen Cacchioli

Managing Director

kirsteencacchioli@hka.com

Kirsteen Cacchioli has over 20 years’ experience supporting quantum experts on construction and engineering disputes. She has acted as lead assistant to the named expert across adjudication, arbitration and litigation, drafting expert reports, joint statements and Scott Schedules, and working closely with clients and legal teams. Kirsteen specialises in quantum expert support and the preparation and defence of claims and counterclaims, including contractual analysis, commercial reviews and cost assessment. Her experience spans major highways and hospital projects, cladding and pier remediation schemes, and complex commercial developments across Europe.

When red flags change meaning: Rethinking maritime sanctions risk in times of crisis

Article

When red flags change meaning: Rethinking maritime sanctions risk in times of crisis

by Noemi Klein

In conflict-affected shipping corridors, classic sanctions indicators can become ambiguous. The real challenge for trade finance specialists is no longer spotting anomalies, but interpreting what those red flags mean quickly, consistently, and defensibly distinguishing security-driven behaviour from illicit conduct.

In maritime trade finance, the challenge is no longer simply identifying red flags. It is determining what those red flags mean in a specific context. In peacetime, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) gap, an abrupt route deviation, clustering of vessels offshore, or an unusual anchorage departure may justifiably trigger suspicion of sanctions evasion. In conflict affected corridors, those same behaviours may instead reflect protection measures, specific naval instructions, known threat avoidance, or interference with navigation systems. The result is a tougher and more consequential control challenge: distinguishing deceptive conduct from security-driven behaviour without falling into the traps of false comfort or blanket de-risking.[1], [2]

That distinction matters acutely in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Recent reporting from UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)[3] and the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC)[4] describes a maritime environment shaped by projectile incidents, critical threat assessments, vessel drifting, congestion at anchor, and electronic interference affecting navigation and AIS reliability. Industry reporting, such as Windward, has also highlighted a sharp rise in Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and AIS disruption in and around the Gulf, with one March 2026 assessment citing more than 1,650 vessels affected by GPS and AIS interference, and multiple spoofing clusters across the region. In such conditions a control framework that treats every anomaly equally will over escalate some legitimate trade and miss the more subtle indicators of actual evasion.[5]

This does not mean classic maritime sanctions indicators have lost their relevance. The UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) continues to identify false flags, ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, irregular sailing patterns, complex ownership structures, false documentation, AIS disablement or spoofing, and altered vessel identifiers as common evasion practices. The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) maritime advisory likewise emphasises deceptive shipping practices such as AIS manipulation, false flagging, ownership opacity, and covert STS activity. The real shift is not in what constitutes a red flag, but the weight any single indicator should carry in conflict conditions, Vessel telemetry alone becomes less decisive, while the broader risk context, multi-source corroboration and documentary coherence become more important.

A classic, but useful comparison, is the age-old piracy risk off the coast of Somalia. Guidance connected to the International Maritime Organisation (“IMO”) principles and industry best practice has long recognised that if the master believes continued AIS operation could compromise the vessel’s safety or security, AIS may be switched off. At the same time, naval forces in some periods have preferred reduced or continued AIS transmission for monitoring through the Gulf of Aden.[6] MARAD’s 2025 advisory[7] also underlined that the piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean remains real, including reported boardings, hijackings, and suspicious approaches far from the Somali coast. The lesson for compliance teams is simple: ‘going dark’ is not inherently illicit, but in times of conflict, it is not inherently benign either. The answer lies in the surrounding pattern.

Conflict vs peacetime: How the meaning of maritime indicators change

IndicatorPeacetime interpretationConflict -zone interpretationMitigation strategies
AIS dark zones / transmission gapsOften a strong indicator of concealment, especially where combined with high-risk trade routes, STS history, or sanctioned geographies.In the Gulf or other active threat corridors, AIS silence may reflect force protection or master discretion in response to a security threat; Somalia piracy guidance is the clearest comparator.Master’s log entries, security advisories, UKMTO / Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (“NCGS”) reporting, company security instructions, and timing correlation with known threat windows.
False Iranian port calls / impossible positionsMay indicate spoofing designed to disguise a sanctions nexus, destination, or origin.In the Gulf conflict environment, false positions may instead reflect GNSS interference or AIS distortion; UKMTO and JMIC have warned of disruption affecting AIS and other systems.Independent location cross-corroboration: satellite data, terminal logs, port agent confirmations, pilotage records, and timestamped bridge evidence.
AIS speed anomaliesIn peacetime, implausible speeds can indicate manipulated AIS data or spoofing.In the Gulf, UKMTO reported a marked increase in AIS speed anomalies around Bandar-e-Pars, the Strait of Hormuz, and wider regional waters during periods of GNSS disruption.Ask whether the anomaly was isolated to one vessel or widespread across the area, and whether bridge teams recorded concurrent navigation interference.
Route deviationsMay suggest positioning for covert STS activity, destination concealment, or sanctions evasion through indirect routing.In conflict zones, route changes may reflect avoidance of strike zones, exclusion areas, military activity, or insurer or operator rerouting decisions.Voyage instructions, rerouting notices, charter party instructions, insurer guidance, and evidence of regional threat alerts at the time of deviation.
Convoy clustering / mass concentration of vesselsIn peacetime, close clustering may suggest coordination between illicit actors or pre-positioning for transfer activity.In the Gulf conflict, clustering may instead be produced by electronic interference, anchorage congestion, blockades, security holding patterns, or ships waiting for safer transit windows.Distinguish networked behaviour from shared disruption: compare counterparty linkages, cargo alignment, and whether unrelated vessels were similarly affected.
Abrupt anchorage departureMay suggest concealment behaviour, hurried STS positioning, or efforts to avoid scrutiny.In conflict zones, departure from anchorage may reflect immediate reaction to nearby incidents, strike risk, or port security instructions.Port authority notices, VTS instructions, security alerts, insurer or operator instructions, and chronology of nearby incidents.
Drifting / loiteringIn peacetime, prolonged drifting can suggest a vessel waiting for covert contact, informal transfer, or evasive routing.In a conflict setting, drifting may be a defensive posture while awaiting clearance, convoy coordination, or safe passage through a high-threat zone.Determine whether drifting coincided with traffic freezes, military advisories, or regional attack warnings.
STS transfersWhile STS activity remains a classic sanctions evasion indicator, particularly when conducted at night, in high‑risk waters, or involving opaque counterparties, it must be assessed in context, as STS operations are also a routine and legitimate feature of certain trades, geographies, and established mother/daughter vessel arrangements.Times of conflict do not neutralise the risk of illicit STS transfers. If anything, conflict can provide cover for deceptive transfers, particularly where AIS reliability is already degraded.Require full STS transfer records, counterpart vessel history, fendering or support data, cargo reconciliation, and six-month AIS and ownership review on both vessels.
Port closure / navigation suspensionIn peacetime, unexpected cessation of movement around a port may sometimes suggest evasive behaviour or unexplained operational anomaly.In the Gulf, navigation restrictions may reflect genuine safety concerns. Qatar temporarily suspended maritime navigation in October 2025 citing GPS malfunction affecting navigation accuracy.[8]Seek official notices, port circulars, operator alerts, terminal instructions, and evidence that the vessel’s behaviour matched broader port-wide restrictions.
Bunkering disruption / force majeureIn peacetime, sudden changes in bunkering location or supply route may warrant review but are not automatically suspicious.In the Iran linked Gulf crisis, disruptions to bunkering hubs such as Fujairah were reported alongside security incidents, suspended deliveries, force majeure declarations, and sharply reduced barge activity.[9]Validate with supplier notices, bunker confirmations, revised port calls, price spikes, and contemporaneous operational alerts rather than inferring illicit motive from change alone.
War-risk insurance withdrawal / coverage shockIn peacetime, inability to secure normal insurance may raise questions about counterparties, voyage legitimacy, or asset risk.[10]In conflict conditions, loss or repricing of cover can itself drive routing changes, delays, anchorage concentration, or selective transit behaviour.Ask for broker correspondence, war-risk endorsements, premium changes, and whether behaviour changed immediately following insurer decisions.
Rapid ownership / manager rotationA classic sanctions-evasion signal, particularly where multiple shell entities or frequent International Safety Management (“ISM”) company or manager changes are involved.Unlike some movement indicators, this remains suspicious in both peacetime and at times of conflict. Conflict does not provide a natural operational rationale for serial beneficial ownership or manager opacity.Enhanced beneficial ownership review, corporate registry checks, historical manager trace, and screening of linked entities and associated vessels.
False or inconsistent cargo documentationAlways a major indicator: mismatched bills of lading, origin inconsistencies, altered certificates, or pricing anomalies are central evasion tools.In high interference conflict conditions, documentation often becomes more, not less, probative than vessel movement alone. When telemetry is noisy, paperwork coherence becomes the tie breaker.Require inspection certificates, quantity or quality reports, market pricing checks, dual review of origin documents, and linkage between trade paperwork and observed physical movement.
Physically altered vessel identifiersA strong evasion indicator in peacetime and a classic attempt to obscure vessel identity.This remains highly suspicious even during conflict. Conflict may explain movement anomalies; it does not explain painted-over IMO numbers or disguised hull markings.Independent vessel imagery, historical registry records, port inspection findings, and cross-platform identifier matching.

Why this matters for trade finance teams

The practical implications are that conflicts should change both the assessment and escalation logic, not lower the standard of scrutiny. Banks should not ignore AIS gaps, route changes, loitering, or unusual port behaviour simply because of conflict. But, nor should it treat those indicators as self-proving.

In conflict-affected routes some of the traditional movement-based signals become less diagnostic on their own, while ownership opacity, document inconsistency, implausible commodity economics, and multi-signal patterning become more important. The point is not that institutions need more alerts, but better judgement. They need to move beyond red flag detection alone and build the capability to make disciplined, defensible decisions under pressure, grounded in sanctions expertise, operational context, investigative rigour, and control frameworks that can withstand the realities of human performance in crisis conditions.


References

[1] Financial sanctions guidance for maritime shipping – GOV.UK

[2] OFAC Sanctions Advisory: Guidance for Shipping and Maritime Stakeholders on Detecting and Mitigating Iranian Oil Sanctions Evasion

[3] UKMTO Recent Incidents– recent incidents page documents attacks and suspicious activity affecting vessels in and around the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman in 2026.

[4] JMIC Advisories – 2026– March 2026 advisory update described a critical threat environment, drifting vessels, anchorage congestion and interference including EMI, AIS spoofing and jamming.

[5] Windward, GPS Jamming Surges in the Middle East Gulf, 1,650 Ships Hit, 8 March 2026

[6] IMO MSC.1/Circ.1339: Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia

Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy, 14 September 2011 Microsoft Word – 1339.doc

[7] 2025-003-Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom | MARAD

[8] Qatar news agency

[9] Force Majeure Declared at Fujairah As Iranian Attacks Disrupt Global Bunker Hub

[10] Marine Insurers Cancel War Risk Cover as Iran Conflict Escalates


Noemi Klein

Director

noemiklein@hka.com

Noémi Klein has over ten years’ experience in financial crime investigations and compliance. She advises organisations on anti‑money laundering, fraud prevention, and anti‑bribery and corruption, supporting senior leadership, boards, counsel, and regulators.

She has particular expertise in sanctions advisory, high‑risk client portfolio management, trade finance and supply chain risk, and regulatory‑driven remediation programmes, including work under the FCA’s Skilled Person framework. Noémi has held both consulting and senior in‑house roles at global banks across Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

Sovereign immunity: Four observations from the investigative perspective

Article

Sovereign immunity: Four observations from the investigative perspective

Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that protects states and their assets from being sued or subjected to enforcement in foreign courts. Yet it is also regularly encountered terrain within the investigative domain.

For investigators, sovereign immunity is not a single question to be answered, but a condition that shapes how information is gathered, assessed and interpreted over time. Facts emerge unevenly, behaviour matters as much as formal structure, and certainty is rarely available at the outset. Within this context, investigators develop ways of working that sit alongside, but are distinct from, legal analysis. Set out below are four observations drawn from that investigative standpoint.

Observation 1: Sovereign immunity as a spectrum, not a status

From an investigative perspective, sovereign immunity may be considered as a structural factor that shapes how an asset can be assessed and which avenues of analysis are viable. A good illustration of this is the long‑running Crystallex v. Venezuela enforcement proceedings, where the assessment of an asset’s immunity relied on analysing its practical function rather than its legal description.

In that case, Crystallex sought to enforce a USD 1.2bn arbitral award against the state of Venezuela by attaching shares of PDV Holding (“PDVH”), a US-registered subsidiary of PDVSA,  Venezuela’s state‑owned oil company and owner of US-registered CITGO Petroleum Corporation (“CITGO”).Although the shares were nominally owned by PDVSA,  CITGO was one of Venezuela’s most valuable foreign assets, making the structure PDVSA → PDVH → CITGO central to assessing what could realistically be reached through enforcement proceedings.[1]

At the investigative stage, immunity is rarely treated as a clear yes or no question, and assets are not simply categorised as immune or non‑immune. Instead, they are assessed along a spectrum of exposure, informed by a elements including operational context, ownership history, and how they have been involved in transactions. Crystallex v. Venezuela illustrates this point: although PDVSA is formally a separate juridical entity, the courts’ reasoning suggests that they examined information pertaining to how PDVSA operated within the Venezuelan state apparatus. Publicly available judgments refer to governance, state direction, financial dependency and the practical role PDVSA played in implementing government policy.[2] The US District Court for Delaware found PDVSA to be Venezuela’s alter ego, a conclusion later affirmed by the Third Circuit.

This shift, from presumptive immunity to attachability, reflects an approach that treats exposure as a spectrum and suggests that the available evidence was capable of supporting a different characterisation of PDVSA. This also illustrates how modern states increasingly pursue their interests through companies and commercial arrangements, rather than through traditional forms of government activity.

Investigators tend to treat immunity claims as provisional, capable of being narrowed or refined as further facts emerge. Much of the information relevant to these assessments can be found outside formal litigation channels. In Crystallex v. Venezuela, the court did not outline its fact‑gathering, but publicly available filings suggest that it had access to corporate documents, financial disclosures, bond prospectuses, and information on dividend flows, asset pledges, and PDVSA’s conduct within the PDVH/CITGO structure. Such commercially derived material can often shed more light on an asset’s actual function as opposed to sovereign assertions alone.

This broader way of looking at sovereign immunity also helps explain why outcomes in sovereign enforcement can be less predictable than their private‑sector equivalents. The legal doctrine sets the framework, but its application often turns on factual patterns that are complex, incomplete, or disputed. Investigators operate within this space, assembling the facts that give the doctrine practical meaning and revealing where an asset’s real‑world use may diverge from its formal classification. The investigator’s role is not to determine whether immunity applies, but to develop the factual foundation on which that legal assessment rests.

Observation 2: Alter ego as a question of behaviour over time

Number Analytics describes the doctrine of alter ego as a legal theory that allows a court or tribunal to disregard the separate legal personality of a corporation and hold its shareholders or affiliated entities liable for its actions.[3] From an investigative perspective, alter ego is less a fixed status and more a pattern of behaviour that develops over time. In some cases, this behaviour only becomes apparent through extended observation, for example when examining how decisions are made, how assets are deployed, or how financial flows consistently track state direction.

Entities linked to sovereign states may operate with a high degree of independence during periods of political stability or favourable market conditions but move into closer alignment with state priorities when circumstances shift. Investigative work therefore looks beyond formal governance structures and focuses on how those arrangements function in practice, particularly when they come under pressure. Boards may appear independent on paper but be made up of individuals whose positions depend on political support in practice. Management teams may have freedom in day to day commercial decisions, yet defer completely to the state on matters of strategic importance. Financial links can add further complexity, particularly through state guarantees, subsidies or capital injections are used to support or steer an entity’s activities.

None of these factors, taken on their own, necessarily defeat separateness. Taken together, however, they can weaken it in ways that are not obvious from corporate records alone.

Investigators also look closely at how decisions are made, including through informal channels. In entities linked to sovereign states, significant decisions may rely on consultation or clearance processes that leave little documentary trace, but the absence of written instructions does not mean that influence is absent. This creates evidential challenges, as influence that is well understood internally may remain largely invisible to outsiders. As a result, alter ego analysis from an investigative perspective may become a matter of probability rather than certainty, supported by repeated behavioural patterns rather than definitive proof of control.

Over time, these behavioural signals can build into a picture of conditional dependence. An entity may not function as a direct arm of the state in all matters, yet its autonomy may narrow at moments of pressure in ways that warrant closer scrutiny. Investigators do not decide whether this dependence meets the legal threshold for alter ego; instead, they identify where formal separation appears most vulnerable. In doing so, they provide factual depth often missing from more conceptual discussions of sovereign corporate autonomy.

Observation 3: Commercial use as a functional, not categorical, concept

Commercial use is often discussed as if it were an inherent feature of an asset, capable of being identified by classification alone. However, this approach does not always apply.

In fact, assets rarely declare themselves as commercial. Instead, their character becomes clear through how they are used, who they deal with, and the practical motives driving their activity. For this reason, investigators tend to focus on function rather than form, looking at the role an asset plays within wider financial and operational arrangements.

In ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, ConocoPhillips sought to enforce an USD 8.5bn arbitral award and turned to US-based assets linked to PDVSA. Although PDVSA formally qualified as a sovereign instrumentality, the publicly available decisions suggest that the courts considered how it behaved in practice (its commercial dealings, revenue‑generating operations, and the way it deployed and controlled subsidiaries abroad) to determine whether the assets were being used commercially.[4] As discussed above, these behavioural indicators appear to have contributed to the conclusion that PDVSA functioned as Venezuela’s alter ego for enforcement purposes, rather than relying solely on its legal status.

In practice, this involves close scrutiny of transactional behaviour. Regular dealings with private counterparties and sustained revenue‑generating activity strongly indicate commercial use, whatever the asset’s formal description. Pricing, contract terms, and risk allocation often reveal more about its true purpose than ownership or stated mandate. Commerciality is therefore usually understood as something demonstrated over time, through consistent and repeated conduct, rather than proved by a single transaction.

Importantly, disputes over commercial use often arise not because such use is absent, but because its importance is contested. From an investigative perspective, that distinction matters. An asset that engages in commercial activity on an occasional basis looks very different from one that operates much like a private company. By placing this behaviour along a chronological spectrum, investigators can build a more nuanced view of exposure without drawing hard lines. This reflects the broader reality of sovereign disputes, where outcomes can depend on small factual differences rather than neat categories.

Observation 4: Mixed-used assets and the practical limits of sovereign asset tracing

Some sovereign assets occupy a grey area between public policy functions and commercial activity. In such cases, the investigative task is not to remove the ambiguity, but to map it: assessing how often the asset engages in commercial dealings, how significant that activity is compared with any public function, and whether that balance shifts over time, especially around moments of dispute or enforcement risk. Attempts to label such assets as purely sovereign or purely commercial overlook how these roles interact in practice.

Tracing mixed-use assets requires a level of detail that is not always possible given limits of time, jurisdiction, or access to information. Financial flows may be commingled, governance structures may be layered, and decision-making may be spread across several entities and jurisdictions. Separating these elements to isolate commercial activity can be time consuming and may not always produce clear results. Investigators therefore have to strike a balance between seeking precision and recognising when further analysis would rely too heavily on assumption. This judgement is rarely visible in the legal record, but it has a significant influence on the scope and depth of investigative work.

There are also practical limits that arise from the way sovereign systems function. Officials may take decisions informally, records can disappear quickly or never be created, and corporate structures may shift at short notice in response to perceived risk. Jurisdictional complexity compounds these challenges, especially when assets sit in places that discourage scrutiny. Even when investigators obtain information, it may arrive too late to capture the asset’s position at the point in time that matters. These constraints do not diminish the value of asset tracing, but they do define the boundaries of what investigators can realistically achieve.

Recognising these limits is an important part of a credible investigative approach. It shows that a lack of firm conclusions does not mean the facts are missing but may reflect structural or temporal constraints. Mixed‑use assets often produce findings that fall along a range of exposure rather than clear yes‑or‑no answers. Investigators work within this partial clarity, providing useful factual insight even if it cannot be complete. In the sovereign context, this kind of qualified understanding is a highly relevant and practical contributions asset tracing can offer.

Concluding observation

Across all four observations, a common theme emerges: sovereign immunity takes practical meaning not from doctrine alone, but from facts that develop unevenly and resist neat categorisation. Investigators operate in this space of qualified certainty, assembling the substance that allows legal analysis to function. In sovereign enforcement, this contextual understanding is not peripheral, it is essential.


[1] https://www.alston.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2023/11/sovereign–states-article.pdf?rev=60c53a720a15430da15b00aad4468c7e&sc_lang=en

[2] https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6169439/crystallex-international-corporation-v-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela/, and  https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/18-2797/18-2797-2019-07-29.html

[3] https://www.numberanalytics.com/blog/alter-ego-doctrine-in-international-arbitration

[4] https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-conocophillips-petrozuata-b-v-conocophillips-hamaca-b-v-and-conocophillips-gulf-of-paria-b-v-v-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela-decision-on-annulment-wednesday-22nd-january-2025


Fiona Harmsen

Senior Managing Consultant

fionaharmsen@hka.com

Fiona Harmsen is an investigator specialising in global complex investigations and cross‑border evidence gathering. She has helped law firms, in‑house teams, and award holders turn incomplete datasets into actionable insight, most often where assets, people, and jurisdictions intersect.

Her work provided critical intelligence and evidence to inform legal strategy and enforcement measures. Her expertise includes identifying leverage points to facilitate settlement, identifying and supporting the recovery of assets, and developing strategies to overcome challenges such as sovereign immunity and alter ego arguments. She has successfully evidenced ownership and control of state assets, and contributed to lobbying and communications strategies to strengthen enforcement efforts. Fiona has worked on disputes in sectors such as logistics, mining, construction, energy, and telecommunications.

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